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Title 
Effects of status and outcome on attributions and just-world beliefs: How the 
social distribution of success and failure may be rationalized 
 
Abstract 
The distribution of success and failure to social groups is supported by lay theories about 
the characteristics of social groups and the causes of their outcomes, as well as by beliefs 
about entitlement of groups to succeed or fail. This paper presents a study where a target 
individual’s socio-economic status (high vs. low) and outcome in a major academic 
achievement task (success vs. failure) were manipulated in a 2 x 2 experimental design. It 
was found that high-status success and low-status failure, i.e. the system-consistent 
outcomes, were attributed relatively more to stable internal causes (ability), whereas high-
status failure and low-status success, i.e. the system-inconsistent outcomes, were attributed 
relatively more to unstable causes (effort). Second, participants’ belief in a just world was 
higher in high-status success and low-status failure than in high-status failure and low-status 
success.    
 
Key words 
attributions for success – failure; ability vs. effort; just-world beliefs; system justification; 
socio-economic status   
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In societies that place emphasis on individual achievement, individuals’ successes 
and failures define their social or human value and presumably prescribe their positions and 
status in society (Gardner, 1961). However, lay theories and ideological beliefs about the 
societal distribution of success and failure are so powerful (e.g. Argyle, 1994; Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999) that a high socio-economic status individual may be judged more favorably 
than a low status person when performing to the same standard (Darley & Gross, 1983). 
Lay theories may orient people to explain how outcomes are distributed across social 
groups by suggesting particular causes for success and failure which in effect reinforce (or 
question) the existing social arrangements. At the same time, they prescribe how outcomes 
should be distributed across social groups by suggesting what groups and individuals are 
entitled to. This paper is concerned with the impact of distributing success and failure to 
individuals of varied social class membership a) on the social attributions for success and 
failure made available to lay people, and b) on people’s belief in a just world where 
individuals and social groups presumably get what they deserve. Our approach points out 
the justificatory and rationalizing role both of shared attributions of the outcomes of social 
classes and prescriptive ideological beliefs about the social distribution of success and 
failure.  
Attribution to ability vs. effort   
Attributions are largely driven by the dominant ideas and ways of making sense 
circulating in society (Deschamps & Beauvois, 1994; Moscovici, 1984), as illustrated in a 
number of studies on the perceived causes of poverty and/or wealth (e.g. Cozzarelli, 
Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Feagin, 1972; Forgas, Morris, & Furnham, 1982). So far, 
research has established the justificatory function of attributions for the outcomes of social 
groups holding asymmetrical positions by pointing to systematic differences in the use of 
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internal vs. external attributions (e.g. Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Deschamps & Beauvois, 
1994; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1982). What is suggested herein is that lay theories and 
ideological beliefs may justify the present distribution of social value in a more subtle way 
by entailing systematic differences in the use of different types of internal attributions, i.e. 
the attributions held to be normative in evaluation contexts in western societies (Beauvois & 
Dubois, 1988; Jellison & Green, 1981). The internal attribution-types particularly appraised 
in these contexts are ability and effort (Graham, 1994; Weiner, 1986). 
Attribution theory and research suggests that the success expectancies held by 
individuals affect attributions for their own successes and failures to ability or to effort. 
According to Weiner’s (1986) taxonomy of the causal properties implicated in attributional 
processes (i.e. locus, controllability, and stability), ability is internal, stable, and 
uncontrollable, whereas effort is internal, unstable, and controllable. Success has been taken 
to be preferentially attributed either to effort (e.g. Luginbuhl, Crowe, & Kahan, 1975) or to 
ability (e.g. Brown & Weiner, 1984) for reasons of perceived controllability. However, it is 
perceived stability that is mainly thought to affect the social value associated with these 
attribution types by shaping expectations of future success (e.g. Nicholls, 1975). Attribution 
theorists emphasize that ability and effort are differentially linked to expectations about the 
likelihood of future success (Anderson & Weiner, 1992), such that an individual who 
believes that they have a high probability of succeeding at a task, and an individual who 
believes that their chances of succeeding are low, would attribute their eventual respective 
success and failure to stable causes, i.e. to ability. The reverse holds true for unstable 
causes: experiences of success and experiences of failure would be attributed to effort by 
individuals with low success expectancy and by those with high success expectancy 
respectively.  
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Whereas self-attribution and hetero-attribution are taken to reflect very different 
concerns (e.g. Hamilton, 1980; Harvey, Harris, & Barnes, 1975; Buss, 1978), the pattern of 
self-attributions defended by attribution theorists may resemble the use of attributions to 
ability and effort with which this paper is concerned. People may resort to using either 
stable or unstable internal causes to account for different-status targets’ successes and 
failures. On the one hand, lay theories suggest that social groups have inherent capacities 
and traits, leading to essentializing the characteristics of social groups as well as the 
positions prescribed for them by society (Hochschild, 1995; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; 
Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Attributing system-consistent outcomes (such as high-
status groups’ successes and low-status groups’ failures) to stable internal causes is a 
powerful way to rationalize the existing distribution of social value, for instance, the 
academic underachievement of working-class students (Croizet & Claire, 1998). On the 
other hand, lay theories about the distribution of social value and relations between social 
groups celebrate the role of diligence and hard work as fundamental to individual mobility. 
In several contexts, an emphasis on effort might praise individuals even more than an 
emphasis on inherent ability. However, effort is unstable, and by being attributed to an 
unstable factor, system-inconsistent outcomes, such as high-status groups’ failures and low-
status groups’ successes, might be explained away as non-permanent irregularities. Thus, 
system-consistent outcomes, such as high-status groups’ success and low-status groups’ 
failure, are likely to be attributed to stable, inherent characteristics and skills, i.e. to ability. 
By contrast, system-inconsistent outcomes, such as high-status groups’ failure and low-
status groups’ success, are likely to be attributed to unstable internal factors, i.e. to effort.  
Beliefs in a just world 
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Just-world theory (Lerner, 1980) posits that individuals need to believe that good 
and bad outcomes, as well as rewards and punishments, are not distributed at random. At an 
early age, people learn that the world is a place where additional investment may entitle 
them to better outcomes, and subsequently conduct their adult lives accordingly. In a ‘just-
world’ order, low-status groups seem doomed to failure, whereas high-status groups are 
bound to succeed (for a review see Furnham, 2003). This insight into entitlement advances 
our understanding of the ideological underpinnings of the social distribution of outcomes. In 
a ‘just-world’, where everyone presumably gets what they deserve, system-consistent 
outcomes should occur. However, in just-world theory, justification of injustice is held to be 
a consequence of individual belief in a just world (BJW), whereas we would rather place 
BJW at the ideological level of analysis (Doise, 1986). This perspective may treat BJW as a 
dependent variable, according to the criteria employed by Brauer and Bourhis (2006) for 
classifying social dominance orientation (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), which is a 
contextually sensitive construct (Huang & Liu, 2005; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 
2003) usually treated as an individual-difference factor. System justification (Jost & Banaji, 
1994), another construct related to BJW, has also been measured as a dependent variable in 
studies manipulating exposure to system-relevant information (Jost & Kay, 2005; Kay & 
Jost, 2003; McCoy & Major, 2007).  
Our question regarding the impact a situation confirming or confuting the existing 
distribution of social value might have upon BJW does not deal with people’s need to 
believe, but instead addresses only the belief in a just world which “can be influenced by 
many factors other than the fundamental need to believe in a just world outlined in just-
world theory” (Hafer & Bègue, 2005, p. 142). Unlike the need to believe in a just world, 
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might BJW vary contextually depending on the kind of outcome different social-group 
members would be faced with?  
The direction of the effect that situational variations might have upon BJW is not 
obvious. Social permeability, as in the case of a low-status individual climbing the social 
ladder, may increase belief in justice in a system-justifying way (Major & Schmader, 2001; 
see also Ho, Sanbonmatsu, & Akimoto, 2002). Thus a system-inconsistent outcome such as 
low-status success should increase BJW. Alternatively, if people use the existing 
distribution of social value as a rule, as Lerner pointed out (“People tend to imbue social 
regularities with an ‘ought’ quality.” Lerner, 1980, p. 10), they might adapt their BJW to the 
context, so that a low-status individual climbing the social ladder would be taken to be a 
violation of the established distribution of social value. By the same token, a high-status 
individual meeting failure would probably question BJW on the grounds that the 
‘deserving’ should not go unrewarded. This reasoning suggests that system-consistent 
outcomes would support BJW more than system-inconsistent ones. 
These predictions were tested by crossing a target individual’s SES with outcome in 
an experimental study conducted in Greece drawing upon university students’ perceptions 
of entrance requirements for admission to postgraduate courses. Participants were presented 
with a scenario describing a candidate of varied socio-economic background who either 
managed to or failed to get into a very demanding course. Subsequently, participants were 
asked to make attributions of the target-student’s outcome, and completed a measure of 
BJW. As regards attributions, it was expected that a high-status target’s success and a low-
status target’s failure (i.e. system-consistent outcomes) would be attributed relatively more 
to ability; by contrast, a high-status target’s failure and a low-status target’s success (i.e. 
system-inconsistent outcomes) would be attributed relatively more to effort. As regards 
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BJW, two alternative predictions were tested: a) that BJW would be comparatively higher 
when outcomes were system-inconsistent; and b) that BJW would be higher when outcomes 
were system-consistent, according to our reasoning above.   
Method 
Participants and experimental design 
 One hundred and twenty-six university students of both sexes (56 male and 70 
female), aged 18-29 (Mage = 20.1), from one of three universities in Athens, participated in 
this study. Participants were randomly assigned to the four experimental conditions, in a 2 
(outcome: Success vs. Failure) x 2 (status: High vs. Low) between-participants factorial 
design.   
Procedure 
 Data were collected in a few sessions in the classroom, each session lasting 
approximately 30 minutes. Participants were asked to take part voluntarily and fill in a 
questionnaire about their views on a topic of interest to them with no other information or 
cover-story being offered.  
 Participants were presented with a scenario about a fictitious character, Yannis, 
sitting an entrance exam for an important postgraduate course. Depending on experimental 
condition, his socio-economic status was either high or low, and further, he either passed or 
failed the exam. Participants read:  
Yannis recently completed his university degree in a subject in which he has always 
been very interested. He means to continue with his studies and do a postgraduate 
course.  
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Yannis’ family is very well-off [not well-off] and lives in a large house in Kifisia [a 
small apartment in Menidi]. As a student he used his own car [the bus] to get to the 
university campus.  
Yannis recently sat some difficult entrance exams for a very prestigious and 
demanding postgraduate course. He got a score of 9 [8] out of 10 and so he 
managed [didn't manage] to get into the course.   
Manipulation checks followed on the next page: participants were asked (a) whether 
Yannis has always been keen on the subject he studied, (b) where Yannis’ family lives, (c) 
what means of transport he used to get the university campus, and (d) whether he managed 
to get onto the postgraduate course. For each question, participants were asked to choose 
between two answers, without having recourse to the scenarios.  
Next, participants filled in a questionnaire on perceived causes of Yannis’ outcome 
and BJW. Lastly, they were asked about their place of residence and for other demographic 
data.  
Measures 
(a) Causal Attribution Scale. This scale, based on Weiner (1986), featured 
attributions varying in locus, stability, and controllability. In its present form, internal 
factors included study skills and examination skills (stable – controllable), study effort, 
preparation for the exam, and concentration on studying (unstable – controllable), ability in 
the subject and language ability (stable – uncontrollable), mood, exam difficulty, and fear of 
the exam (unstable – uncontrollable). External factors included family help and help from 
private tutors (stable – controllable), home conditions (stable – uncontrollable), and luck 
(unstable – uncontrollable) (as in other work [e.g. Cheung & Rudowicz, 2003], external – 
unstable – controllable factors were not included). Participants were asked to rate how much 
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Yannis’ outcome was affected by each of these 14 factors on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at 
all, 7 = greatly). A principal component analysis produced 6 components almost identical in 
content with the above attribution-types (external – stable attributions, both controllable and 
uncontrollable, were accounted for by a single component). Internal consistency of 
subscales after averaging across individual items loading on each component was good (.74 
to .81) except for the ‘internal – unstable – uncontrollable’ subscale (.40) which was 
excluded from further analysis. Thus, 5 registers of causal attributions were analyzed: 
internal – stable – controllable (‘skill’), internal – unstable – controllable (‘effort’), internal 
– stable – uncontrollable (‘ability’), external – stable (‘support’), and external – unstable – 
uncontrollable (‘luck’).        
In addition to the above items, one question addressed attributions to ability vs. 
effort on a bipolar scale (1 = ability, 7 = effort), forcing participants to choose between 
them:  
In your opinion, was Yannis' performance due to his ability, or to how hard he tried before 
the exams? [‘ability vs. effort’].  
(b) Causal Dimension Scale. The Revised Causal Dimension Scale (CDSII; 
McAuley, Duncan, & Russell, 1992) was used as a measure of the causal dimensions 
underlying participants’ attributions. Like most work in the field, this scale measures 
attributions to self rather than to others, therefore personal pronouns were changed where 
appropriate. Participants were presented with 12 bipolar 7-point scales anchored in their 
extremes by opposing possible causes of Yannis’ outcome. These bipolar scales measured 
locus of causality (e.g. Is the cause of Yannis performance something: ‘inside of him’ [ = 1] 
vs. ‘outside of him’ [ = 7]), stability (e.g. Is the cause… ‘permanent’ [ = 1] vs. ‘temporary’ [ 
= 7]), personal control (e.g. Is the cause… ‘manageable by him’ [ = 1] vs. ‘not manageable 
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by him’ [ = 7]) and external control (e.g. Is the cause… ‘under the power of other people’ [ 
= 1] vs. ‘not under the power of other people’ [ = 7]). To make results easier to read, scores 
were reversed such that the higher a score, the more internal, stable, and personally 
controlled an outcome was perceived. Internal consistency of the four subscales after 
averaging across respective items was high, ranging from .79 to .85.    
(c) Belief in a just world. Participants were administered the 20-item Rubin and 
Peplau (1975) scale, previously used on another sample of Greek students (Papastamou & 
Prodromitis, 2003). In this scale, 11 items measure belief in a just world (e.g. “People who 
get ‘lucky breaks’ have usually earned their good fortune”), and the remaining 9 items 
measure belief in an unjust world (e.g. “I’ve found that a person rarely deserves the 
reputation he or she has”). We present results on a single index of BJW ( = .73) after 
appropriate reverse-scoring and averaging across items.   
Results 
Seven of the 126 participants, evenly distributed across experimental conditions 
(2(1) = .06, ns), failed the manipulation checks and their data were excluded from further 
analysis. 
Causal Attribution Scale 
A 2 (outcome) x 2 (status) x 5 (attribution-type) ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the last factor produced a significant main effect of the within-participant factor, F(4, 456) = 
22.64, p < .001, suggesting differential treatment of attribution-types. Effort was rated 
higher than all other attributions (M = 5.66, SD = 1.10), followed by ability (M = 5.27, SD = 
1.35) and skill (M = 5.19, SD = 1.45), and, finally, by both registers of external attributions 
(M = 4.52, SD = 1.39 for support; M = 4.36, SD = 1.70 for luck). Attribution-type interacted 
significantly with outcome, F(4, 456) = 3.79, p < .005, suggesting a positivity bias in all 
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internal attributions: more than failure, success was attributed to effort (Msucc. = 5.96, SD = 
.91 vs. Mfail. = 5.34, SD = 1.20), to ability (Msucc. = 5.52, SD = 1.33 vs. Mfail. = 5.02, SD = 
1.33), and to skill (Msucc. = 5.67, SD = 1.29 vs. Mfail. = 4.69, SD = 1.45) (all ps < .05). 
The interaction of attribution-type, outcome, and status was also significant, F(4, 
456) = 18.40, p < .001. Two-way ANOVA’s on each attribution-type produced significant 
interactions on two attribution-types: ability and luck. As may be seen in Table 1, ability 
was rated comparatively higher in high-status success and in low-status failure than in high-
status failure and low-status success. On the other hand, high-status failure and, particularly, 
low-status success were attributed to luck more than high-status success and low-status 
failure (see also, for instance, Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Frieze & Weiner, 1971).  
---------------------------------------------Table 1 about here------------------------------------------- 
The two-way interaction for effort was not significant (see Table 1). However, in 
within-participant comparisons between effort and ability, ability was rated higher than 
effort in the low-status failure condition, t(30) = 2.64, p < .02, and, though not significantly, 
in the high-status success condition, t(28) = 1.39, ns. The pattern of attributions to ability 
and effort was further clarified by a 2-way ANOVA on the bipolar ‘ability vs. effort’ scale, 
which produced another significant interaction, F(1, 115) = 27.85, p < .001. High-status 
failure and low-status success were clearly attributed to effort far more than were both high-
status success and low-status failure (see Figure 1). 
---------------------------------------------Figure 1 about here------------------------------------------ 
Causal Dimension Scale 
 A 2 (outcome) x 2 (status) x 4 (causal dimension) ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor produced a significant interaction of causal dimension and outcome, F(3, 
345) = 9.23, p < .001. Compared to failure, success was considered more internal (Msucc. = 
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3.19, SD = 1.31 vs. Mfail. = 3.87, SD = 1.43), more stable (Msucc. = 3.93, SD = 1.41 vs. Mfail. 
= 4.74, SD = 1.67), more a matter of personal control (Msucc. = 3.06, SD = 1.32 vs. Mfail. = 
3.90, SD = 1.42), but less a matter of external control (Msucc. = 4.41, SD = 1.24 vs. Mfail. = 
3.80, SD = 1.43) (all ps < .05).  
The 3-way interaction was also significant, F(3, 345) = 20.71, p < .001. Two-way 
ANOVA’s on each dimension revealed significant interactions of status and outcome on 
locus and stability, but none on controllability (see Table 2). First, system-consistent 
outcomes were considered more internal than the system-inconsistent ones: high-status 
success was attributed to internal causes more than high-status failure or low-status success, 
and low-status failure was attributed to internal causes more than high-status failure. 
Second, high-status success and low-status failure were attributed to stable causes 
significantly more than high-status failure and low-status success.  
---------------------------------------------Table 2 about here------------------------------------------- 
Belief in a just world  
The two-way ANOVA produced a significant interaction, F(1, 115) = 5.08, p < .03, 
with BJW relatively higher in high-status success and in low-status failure (see Figure 2). 
Both high-status success and low-status failure differed reliably from low-status success, 
but did not differ reliably from high-status failure.  
---------------------------------------------Figure 2 about here------------------------------------------ 
Discussion 
One way in which lay theories and beliefs explain the distribution of outcomes to 
social groups might be the systematic variation in the attribution of success and failure to 
ability and effort. Participants in this study generally endorsed effort more than ability as a 
causal attribution, probably reflecting the emphasis laid on effort within the present type of 
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societal organization, where diligence is worshiped as the cornerstone of individual 
mobility, and where common assumptions such as ‘hard work pays dividends’ form an 
achievement cult (Ehrenberg, 1991). However, the preference for effort over ability clearly 
applies to system-inconsistent outcomes (high-status failure and low-status success). When 
outcomes were in line with the status quo (high-status success and low-status failure), 
attributions to ability were endorsed even more than effort. Hence, not only may the system-
consistent outcomes be attributed to ability more than the system-inconsistent ones in 
relative terms, but they may also be attributed to ability more than to effort, just as the 
system-inconsistent outcomes may be attributed to effort more than to ability. As shown 
with the aid of the Causal Dimension Scale, these systematic differences reflect differences 
in perceived stability (and, tellingly, in perceived locus) of respective outcomes. In this 
sense, the attribution of system-consistent outcomes to ability reflects the emphasis society 
places on stable internal factors such as personality traits in a great number of evaluation-
relevant contexts, which range from organizational practices to psychological theories of 
individual differences (Beauvois & Le Poultier, 1986). These findings add to the literature 
on the justificatory function of stable and unstable attributions. Attributing system-
consistent outcomes to inherent capacities of groups and individuals essentially favors the 
existing distribution of social value (e.g. Hochschild, 1995; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; 
Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997), whereas attributing the system-inconsistent outcomes 
to unstable internal causes explains away these outcomes as non-permanent irregularities. 
These findings may also extend the literature on attributions for expected and unexpected 
outcomes. It is possible that social accounts of the outcomes of social classes become 
internalized and affect individual expectancies, thereby resulting in the self-perpetuating 
cycle identified by attribution theorists (Anderson & Weiner, 1992; Weiner, 1986): making 
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stable attributions for expected outcomes (in the cases of high-status and low-status 
individuals holding high and low success-expectancies respectively) and making unstable 
attributions for unexpected outcomes (in the cases of low-status and high-status individuals 
holding high and low success-expectancies respectively). 
 Lay theories also prescribe the distribution of outcomes in society by suggesting the 
degree to which social groups are entitled to achievement. The present paper makes a case 
for the possible impact of the social distribution of outcomes upon individuals’ beliefs about 
entitlement and ‘deservingness’, and gives evidence that the world may be thought of as a 
just place in the face of system-consistent outcomes more than in the event of system-
inconsistent ones. These results have implications for the perpetuation of power-relations in 
general, as well as for the consequences of exposure to system-inconsistent outcomes in 
particular. Research on system-justification has shown that a challenge to the social system 
often results in increased motivation to justify the system (for a review see Jost & Hunyady, 
2002). Thus, exposure to a situation in which a low-status individual succeeds should 
increase belief in justice, particularly so if success is linked to some compensatory 
characteristic. As a strand of studies on the effect of complementary stereotypes upon 
system justification suggests (see Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 
2007), people would justify the system mostly after exposure to situations in which low-
status targets are presented as possessing compensatory characteristics (e.g. honesty, 
friendliness, etc.). Although it is unclear whether we might posit effort as another 
compensatory characteristic of low-status groups, if that was the case, belief in justice 
should increase even more. Yet the present pattern of results suggests otherwise. An 
individual who ‘makes his way up’ is probably considered to be violating the order that 
corresponds to the established distribution of social value, suggesting that social regularities 
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indeed become prescriptive (Lerner, 1980). This insight makes a contribution to the 
understanding of the cognitive (rather than motivational) aspects in BJW which, according 
to Jost and Hunyady (2002), are closer to the concept of dominant ideology. ‘Cognitive’ 
aspects do not imply some information processing directed at representing reality; we 
assume that ideological elements such as BJW (as well as shared attributions of the 
outcomes of social classes) rationalize the social distribution of values rather than merely 
reflect the existing distribution of outcomes to social groups (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost 
& Banaji, 1994). 
Nevertheless, our results may question the ideological assumptions about the value 
of diligence which are intrinsic to BJW. A common way to see deservedness, which is what 
BJW is all about, is that people have most probably done something to earn their place in 
society. Thus high SES groups might be expected to have achieved great things to deserve 
such status, as opposed to the underachievements of lower SES groups. However, our 
results regarding inferred ability and effort would further suggest that this assumption does 
not generally hold, meaning that people would demand that only low SES group-members 
should ‘earn’ a place in society. 
Finally, two additional caveats are warranted. First, the current study was conducted 
in Greece, which has experienced remarkable social mobility since the end of World War II, 
and values individual achievement, competence, and other features of a market economy 
and liberalism. Yet even in contexts with cultural similarities, such as the United States and 
Australia, exposure to the same system-relevant information may produce differential 
consequences (Mandisodza, Jost, & Unzueta, 2006; see also Feather, 1998). Secondly, like 
most studies, our research operationalized social class as socio-economic status, although 
the two concepts are not semantically identical. SES indicators capture economic and other 
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resources, whereas ‘class’ implies some sort of social relation “characterized by 
discrimination, […] power, and/or exploitation.” (Ostrove & Cole, 2005, p. 682). This 
relational aspect might only have been implicit in our research - had it been more salient, 
the results would probably have expressed stronger motivational concerns than suggested 
here.   
 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 18 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Bernard Weiner for his kind suggestions and help with attribution 
measures, and Jamin Halberstadt for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 19 
References 
Anderson, C. A., & Weiner, B. (1992). Attribution and attributional processes in 
personality. In G. Caprara & G. Heck (Eds.), Modern personality psychology: 
Critical reviews and new directions (pp. 295-324). New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Argyle, M. (1994). The psychology of social class. London: Routledge. 
Beauvois, J. L., & Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of 
psychological events. European Journal of Social Psychology, 54, 51-61.  
Beauvois, J. L., & Le Poultier, F. (1986). Norme d’internalité et pouvoir social en 
psychologie quotidienne. Psychologie Française, 31, 100-108. 
Brauer, M., & Bourhis, R. Y. (2006). Social power. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 36, 601-616. 
Brown J., & Weiner B. (1984). Affective consequences of ability versus effort ascriptions 
controversies, resolutions, and quandaries. Journal of Educational Psychology, 76, 
146-158. 
Buss, A. (1978). Causes and reasons in attribution theory: A conceptual critique. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1311-1321. 
Cheung, C.-K., & Rudowicz, E. (2003). Underachievement and attributions among students 
attending schools stratified by student ability. Social Psychology of Education, 6, 
303-323. 
Cozzarelli, C., Wilkinson, A. V., & Tagler, M. J. (2001). Attitudes toward the poor and 
attributions for poverty. Journal of Social Issues, 57, 207-227. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 20 
Croizet, J.-C., & Claire, T. (1998). Extending the concept of stereotype and threat to social 
class: The intellectual underperformance of students from low socioeconomic 
backgrounds. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 588-594. 
Darley, J. M., & Gross, P. H. (1983). A hypothesis-confirming bias in labelling effects. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 20-33. 
Deaux, K., & Emswiller, T. (1974). Explanation of successful performance on sex-linked 
task: What is skill for male is luck for the female. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 29, 80-85. 
Deschamps, J.-C., & Beauvois, J.-L. (1994). Attributions intergroupes. In R. Y. Bouhris & 
J.-P. Leyens (Eds.), Stéréotypes, discrimination et relations intergroupes. Liège: 
Mardaga. 
Doise, W. (1986). Levels of explanation in social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Ehrenberg, A. (1991). Le culte de la performance. Paris: Calmann-Levy. 
Feagin, J. R. (1972). Poverty: We still believe that God helps them who help themselves. 
Psychology Today, 6, 101-129. 
Feather, N. T. (1998). Attitudes towards high achievers, self-esteem, and value priorities for 
Australian, American, and Canadian students. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 29, 749-759. 
Forgas, J. P., Morris, S. L., & Furnham, A. (1982). Lay explanations of wealth: Attributions 
for economic success. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12, 381-397. 
Frieze, I. H., & Weiner, B. (1971). Cue utilization and attributional judgements for success 
and failure. Journal of Personality, 39, 591-605. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 21 
Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 795-817. 
Gardner, J. (1961). Excellence: Can we be excellent and equal too? New York: Harper-
Row. 
Graham, S. (1994). Classroom motivation from an attributional perspective. In H. F. 
O’Neil, Jr. & M. Drillings (Eds.), Motivation theory and research. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Hafer, C. L., & Bègue, L. (2005). Experimental research on just-world theory: Problems, 
developments, and future challenges. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 128-167. 
Hamilton, V. L. (1980). Intuitive psychologist or intuitive lawyer? Alternative models of the 
attribution process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 767-772. 
Harvey, J. H., Harris, B., & Barnes, R. D. (1975). Actor–observer differences in the 
perception of responsbility and freedom. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 32, 22-28. 
Hewstone, M., & Jaspars, J. (1982). Intergroup relations and attribution processes. In H. 
Tajfel (Ed.), Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ho, E. A., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., & Akimoto, S. A. (2002). The effects of comparative status 
on social stereotypes: How the perceived success of some persons affects the 
stereotypes of others. Social Cognition, 20, 36-57. 
Hochschild, J. L. (1995). Facing up to the American dream. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press 
Hoffman, C., & Hurst, N. (1990). Gender stereotypes: Perception or rationalization? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 197-208. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 22 
Huang, L., & Liu, J. H. (2005). Personality and social structural implications of the 
situational priming of social dominance orientation. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 38, 267-276.    
Jellison, J. M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental 
attribution error: The norm of internality. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 40, 643-649. 
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. R. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system justification and the 
production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 1-27. 
Jost, J. T., & Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justification and the palliative 
function of ideology. European Review of Social Psychology, 13, 111-153. 
Jost, J. T., & Kay, A. C. (2005). Exposure to benevolent sexism and complementary gender 
stereotypes: Consequences for specific and diffuse forms of system justification. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 498–509. 
Kay, A. C., & Jost, J. T. (2003). Complementary justice: Effects of “poor but happy” and 
“poor but honest” stereotype exemplars on system justification and implicit 
activation of the justice motive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 
823-837. 
Kay, A. C., Jost, J. T., Mandisodza, A. N., Sherman, S. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Johnson, A. 
L. (2007). Panglossian ideology in the service of system justification: How 
complementary stereotypes help us to rationalize inequality. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 305-358. 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A fundamental delusion.  New York: 
Plenum. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 23 
Luginbuhl, J. E. R., Crowe, D. H., & Kahan, J. P. (1975). Causal attribution for success and 
failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 86-93. 
Major, B., & Schmader, T. (2001). Legitimacy and the construal of social disadvantage. In 
J. T. Jost & B. Major (Eds.), The psychology of legitimacy (pp. 176-204). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mandisodza, A. N., Jost, J. T., & Unzueta, M. M. (2006). “Tall Poppies” and “American 
Dreams”: Reactions to rich and poor in Australia and the United States. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37, 659-668.  
McAuley, E., Duncan, T. E., & Russell, D. W. (1992). Measuring causal attributions: The 
Revised Causal Dimension Scale (SDSII). Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 18, 566-573. 
McCoy, S. K., & Major, B. (2007). Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification 
of inequality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 341-351. 
Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. M. Farr & S. 
Moscovici (Eds.), Social Representations (pp. 3-69). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Nicholls, J. G. (1975). Causal attribution and other achievement related cognitions: Effects 
of task outcome, attainment, value and sex. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 31, 379-389. 
Papastamou, S., & Prodromitis, G. (2003). Tromokratia kai exousia [Terrorism and power.] 
Athens: Ellinika Grammata. 
Rubin, Z., & Peplau, L. (1975). Who believes in a just world? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 
65-89. 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 24 
Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., & Kappen, D. M. (2003). Attitudes towards group-
based inequality: Social dominance or social identity? British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 42, 161-186.  
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social 
hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Weiner, B. (1979). A theory of motivation for some classroom experiences. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 71, 3-25. 
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: Springer-
Verlag. 
Yzerbyt, V., Rocher, S., & Schadron, G. (1997). Stereotypes as explanations: A subjective 
essentialistic view of group perception. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & 
S.A. Haslam (Eds.), The social psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 20-
50). Cambridge: Blackwell. 
 
 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
 25 
 
 
Figure 1. Attributions to ability vs. effort by levels of target’s status and type of outcome. 
Note. 1 = ability, 7 = effort. Error-bars represent confidence intervals of 95%. 
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Figure 2. Participants’ Belief in a Just World by levels of target’s status and outcome. 
Note. Scale is 7-point. The higher a mean, the higher BJW. Error-bars represent confidence 
intervals of 95%. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations (in italics) for 5 attribution-types across 
experimental conditions.  
 High status Low status status x 
outcome 
 Success Failure Success Failure F(1, 115) 
internal–unstable– 
controllable (effort) 
5.81
 
.81 
5.48
 
1.21 
6.11
 
.98 
5.21
 
1.18 
     2.24 
internal–stable– 
uncontrollable (ability) 
6.09a 
.98 
4.18b 
1.38 
5.00b 
1.41 
5.74a 
.73 
     38.37* 
internal–stable–controllable 
(skill) 
5.40 
1.24 
4.43 
1.42 
5.94 
1.30 
4.90 
1.48 
     .04 
external–stable (support) 4.61 
1.16 
4.75 
1.54 
4.40 
1.25 
4.46 
1.55 
     .01 
external–unstable–
uncontrollable (luck) 
3.52a 
1.64 
4.70bc 
1.88 
5.39b 
1.23 
3.90ac 
1.40 
     20.34* 
Note. * p < .001. All scales are 7-point. In the same row, means that do not share a common 
subscript differ at p < .05 (Bonferroni-test). 
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Table 2. Means and standard deviations (in italics) for perceived causal dimensions across 
experimental conditions.  
 High status Low status status x 
outcome 
 Success Failure Success Failure F(1, 115) 
Locus  5.28a 
1.14 
3.64b 
1.53 
4.37bc 
1.32 
4.56ac 
1.19 
     14.62* 
Stability 5.00a 
1.33 
2.05b 
.81 
3.19b 
.78 
4.34a 
1.49 
     94.00* 
Personal control 5.00 
1.33 
4.42 
1.42 
4.88 
1.33 
3.82 
1.39 
     .92 
External control 3.42 
1.40 
4.23 
1.59 
3.74 
1.06 
4.18 
1.31 
     .55 
Note. * p < .001. All scales are 7-point. The higher the mean, the more internal, stable, a 
matter of personal control, or a matter of external control, a cause respectively. In the same 
row, means that do not share a common subscript differ at p < .05 (Bonferroni-test). 
 
 
